Book Review: Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and Free Speech. by Richard Polenberg. by Parrish, Michael E.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1989
Book Review: Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case,
the Supreme Court, and Free Speech. by Richard
Polenberg.
Michael E. Parrish
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Parrish, Michael E., "Book Review: Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and Free Speech. by Richard Polenberg."
(1989). Constitutional Commentary. 726.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/726
190 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:115 
FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH. By Richard 
Polenberg.1 New York, N.Y.: Viking Press. 1987. Pp. 1x, 
431. $24.95. 
Michael E. Parrish 2 
Great cases may, as Holmes observed, make bad law, but in the 
hands of a talented scholar they often become superb legal history. 
Examples include Stanley Kuder's study of the Charles River 
Bridge case,3 Don Fehrenbacher's exhaustive treatment of Dred 
Scott,4 Charles Rosenberg's inquiry into the trial of Charles 
Guiteau,s John Noonan's The Antelope,6 and A.W.B. Simpson's 
Cannibalism and the Common Law.7 To this distinguished list 
should be added Richard Polenberg's splendid new book on the 
World War I sedition case, Abrams v. United States. The sooner 
this volume appears in paperback, the sooner will courses in Ameri-
can legal history be enriched. 
Professor Polenberg's title comes, of course, from Holmes's 
celebrated dissenting opinion in that case, an opinion which, as con-
stitutional scholars know, gave a new, libertarian twist to his own 
"clear and present danger" test and remains one of the towering 
monuments in our constitutional literature: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you 
have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all 
your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. 
To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, 
as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-
heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But 
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to 
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that 
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be 
1. Professor of History, Cornell University. 
2. Professor of History, University of California, San Diego. 
3. S. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCfJON: THE CHARLES RIVER 
BRIDGE CASE (1971). 
4. D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN 
LAW AND PoLmCS (1978). 
5. C. ROSENBERG, THE TRIAL OF THE AssASSIN GUITEAU: PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 
IN THE GILDED AGE (1968). 
6. J. NOONAN, THE ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED AFRICANS IN 
THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JAMES MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (1977). 
7. A. SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW: THE STORY OF THE 
TRAGIC LAST VOYAGE OF THE MIGNONETTE AND THE STRANGE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS TO 
WHICH IT GAVE RISE (1984). 
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carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, 
as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our 
salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experi-
ment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against at-
tempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught 
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the 
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save 
the country .... Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave 
the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweep-
ing command, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." 
Of course I am speaking only of expressions of opinion and exhortations, which 
were all that were uttered here, but I regret that I cannot put into more impressive 
words my belief that in their conviction upon this indictment the defendants were 
deprived of their rights under the Constitution of the United States.S 
191 
The occasion for this eloquence was the Court's review in Oc-
tober 1919 of the convictions a year earlier in New York City of 
three Russian anarchists-Abrams, Mollie Steimer, and Hyman 
Lachowsky-and one socialist, Samuel Lipman, for violating the 
Sedition Act of 1918 which made it a crime, among other things, to 
"willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scur-
rilous, or abusive language" about the United States's forms of gov-
ernment or to "willfully urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of 
production in this country of any thing or things . . . necessary or 
essential to the prosecution of the war ... with intent by such cur-
tailment to cripple or hinder the United States in the prosecution of 
the war." The four avid supporters of the Bolshevik Revolution 
had printed and distributed leaflets in English and Yiddish that con-
demned United States military intervention into the civil war raging 
in Russia and called on American workers to protest this policy. 
The Yiddish leaflet, but not the English one, urged a general strike. 
Although their defense attorney argued that they intended to criti-
cize the invasion of the Soviet Union, not to disrupt the war effort 
against Germany, and that the first amendment barred their prose-
cution, the trial judge and the jury rejected these contentions. After 
deliberating for little more than an hour, the jury returned a guilty 
verdict. Judge Henry DeLamar Clayton, Jr., a former congressman 
from Alabama best known for his sponsorship of antitrust legisla-
tion, imposed the maximum sentence on Abrams, Lipman, and 
Lachowsky of twenty years in prison and fines of $1,000. In an act 
of chivalry, he sentenced Steimer to fifteen years and a fine of $500. 
Only about a third of Polenberg's gripping book, based largely 
on an extraordinary range of sources in thirty-six libraries, exam-
ines how the American legal system dealt with Abrams and his con-
federates from trial to final appeal in the Supreme Court. Even in 
8. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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this well-trod area, Polenberg offers fresh information and new in-
sights such as the pre-trial strategy of government prosecutors and 
defense attorney Harry Weinberger; the government's mistransla-
tion of the Yiddish broadside that worked to the defendants' disad-
vantage; and the transformation of Justice Holmes's thinking on 
freedom of speech under the influence of friends and critics. The 
author has a deft grasp of criminal procedure, relevant constitu-
tional history, and jurisprudential issues. But the richness of this 
work derives, finally, not from its explication of legal issues, how-
ever excellent, but from Polenberg's ability to place Abrams in its 
full social, cultural, and political context and in so doing to en-
lighten us about a vast range of other important matters: 
-the social and intellectual world of American anarchists im-
mediately before, during, and after World War I. 
-the apparatus of government surveillance and repression of 
radicals in 1917-20, which included, among others, the Bomb Squad 
of the New York City Police Department, Military Intelligence, the 
state investigating committee headed by Clayton Riley Lusk, and 
the General Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 
-the harrowing conditions inside local and federal penal insti-
tutions such as the New York City Workhouse on Blackwell's Is-
land, the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, and the Missouri state 
prison in Jefferson City. 
-the nightmarish existence of anarchists, deported from the 
United States to the Soviet Union and then driven into further exile 
by their new Bolshevik tormentors. 
Along the way, Polenberg offers memorable vignettes of the 
leading actors in this historic legal drama. In his dissent, Holmes 
never referred to Abrams, Steimer, Lachowsky, and Lipman by 
name. He called them "poor and puny anonymities," who pro-
fessed a "creed of ignorance and immaturity." Polenberg rescues 
the defendants from historical obscurity with a series of affectionate 
portraits about the book binders (Abrams and Lachowsky), the fur-
rier (Lipman), and the ladies shirtwaist maker (Steimer), who 
risked imprisonment and exile for their political beliefs and in so 
doing helped to change our Constitution. 
In addition to probing the lives and ideas of the defendants, 
Polenberg offers vivid accounts of the motives and behavior of 
others, including Weinberger, indefatigable in his efforts to secure 
justice for people trapped in the web of wartime hysteria; Henry 
DeLamar Clayton, a hanging judge if ever there was one, whose 
southern gentility could not disguise his loathing for the defendants 
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and his partisan conduct of the trial; Frederick Howe, the decent, 
reform-minded Commissioner of Immigration, who strove to make 
the once-wretched conditions at Ellis Island habitable; Kate Rich-
ards O'Hare, the striking "Red Kate" of the Socialist Party, who 
agitated against the war and battled for prison reform; Woodrow 
Wilson, pathetically seeking in his final days in office to rectify by 
means of clemency some of the human suffering inflicted by his De-
partment of Justice, but finally dissuaded from that course by the 
disingenuous arguments of his mean-spirited attorneys general, 
Thomas Gregory and A. Mitchell Palmer. 
The radical defendants, not Holmes and Brandeis, are the cen-
tral figures in this book, but Polenberg's treatment of the two Jus-
tices who dissented in Abrams reminds us once again why they 
remain such imposing figures in our constitutional history. Until 
Abrams, neither Holmes nor Brandeis could be regarded as a 
staunch libertarian on the question of freedom of speech. Holmes, 
in fact, had authored three opinions before the war (Patterson v. 
Colorado; Moyer v. Peabody, and Fox v. Washington) that displayed 
gross insensitivity to this right, and his famous "clear and present 
danger" standard, first formulated in the Espionage Act case of 
Schenck v. United States,9 had been invoked to justify the convic-
tion of the general secretary of the Socialist Party. With Brandeis 
joining him, Holmes had used the same test to affirm the convic-
tions of other war-time dissenters, most notably Eugene Debs and 
Jacob Frohwerk. 
Between Schenck and Abrams, however, Holmes experienced a 
genuine conversion when his opinion came under sharp criticism 
from people he respected (Learned Hand, Harold Laski, Ernst 
Freund, and Frederick Pollock) and as he read several other works 
(James Ford Rhodes's History of the Civil War and F.S. Marvin's 
The Century of Hope) that dramatized for him the enormous intel-
lectual costs resulting from the suppression of political opinions 
during war. It is not going too far to suggest that in Holmes's dis-
sent in Abrams we have one of the few examples in our history of 
the force of enlightened opinion actually working to transform con-
stitutional doctrine. Although he still refused to accept Hand's very 
liberal "direct incitement" test, Holmes boldly recast "the clear and 
present danger" standard in Abrams to the point where it finally 
protected speech rather than justified its suppression. 
Building on Holmes's foundation in Abrams, Brandeis devel-
oped an even more libertarian position by 1920 when in his dissent-
ing opinion in Gilbert v. Minnesota he argued that the "clear and 
9. 249 u.s. 47 (1919). 
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present danger" standard should not only control jury verdicts in 
free speech cases but also limit legislative discretion.w Holmes re-
fused to travel that road, informed Brandeis that he had gone "too 
far," and joined Justice McKenna's opinion upholding Gilbert's 
conviction under the Minnesota criminal anarchy statute. II When 
the Warren Court finally drove a constitutional stake through the 
heart of these remaining sedition laws in the late 1960s, it did so by 
invoking the Holmes of Abrams and the Brandeis of Gilbert. 
In a case as rich with social and intellectual significance as this 
one, there were bound to be a few striking ironies. Polenberg cap-
tures these, too. Supporters of the defendants, many of them anar-
chists and socialists, cashed in Liberty Bonds to raise their bail. 
Punished for defending the Bolshevik Revolution in America, they 
were later banished from the Soviet Union for counterrevolutionary 
activities. Vicious though they sometimes were, even Henry Clay-
ton and J. Edgar Hoover showed a greater respect for civil liberties 
than Felix Dzerzhinsky and the Cheka. 
THE THINKING REVOLUTIONARY: PRINCIPLE 
AND PRACTICE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC. By Ralph 
Lemer.t Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1987. Pp. 
XV, 238. $24.95. 
Robert Scigliano 2 
In this collection of seven essays, Professor Ralph Lerner 
shows himself to be a discerning student of early American political 
thought and practice. Rich and subtle in understanding and grace-
ful in expression, these essays must be read with care if their merits 
are to be fully appreciated. All of them will receive some notice 
here, but most of my attention will be given to "The Supreme Court 
as Republican Schoolmaster," both because its subject is closest to 
the concerns of this journal and because it raises the most questions 
in my mind. 
Professor Lerner begins with an effort at "Recovering the 
Revolution" from "modern historians," among whom J.G.A. 
Pocock, Bernard Bailyn, and, above all, Gordon S. Wood figure 
10. 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
11. /d. at 334 (Holmes, J., concurring). 
1. Professor of Social Thought, University of Chicago. 
2. Professor of Political Science, Boston College. 
